An Essential Tenet Of Reformed Theology *Is* Determinism; The Reformed Need To Embrace It
We are free and morally responsible when in possession of certain cognitive capacities that produce different acts given different states of affairs. Freedom is accompanied by dispositional powers to try to choose according to our cognitive faculties. The capstone of our freedom comes in having been endowed with a “mesh” of first and second-order desires (desires to act and the ability to approve of such desires), which differentiate us from creatures of brute instinct, and perhaps those who act according to addictions and phobias too.
When it comes to the question of whether Reformed theology entails a principle of determinism, either disagreement abounds among Reformed theologians or else many within the tradition are talking by each other.
Perhaps some are in theological agreement over this essential aspect of Reformed theology while expressing themselves in conflicting ways. Perhaps. Regardless, there is no less a need to adopt a uniform theological taxonomy by which such theological ideas and concepts can be articulated and evaluated.
Semantics or substantive disagreement?
R.C. Sproul denied determinism yet affirmed “self-determination.” Sproul also rejected spontaneity of choice, whereas Douglas Kelly has favored it. Tom Nettles favors determinism whereas Burk Parsons was relieved to learn it is not an entailment of Reformed Theology. Richard Muller has claimed that Reformed theology does not entail a form of determinism. D.A. Carson and Muller disagree on the freedom to do otherwise. John Frame, James Anderson, and Paul Manata recognize that Reformed theology operates under a robust principle of determinism.
Either we are in need of tightening up our theology within the Reformed tradition or else we need to get a better handle on our terminology. (With the exception of one from above, I am hopeful that there might be general theological agreement yet without clarity of articulation.)
Back to the 1800s:
19th century Princeton Theological Seminary theologian A.A. Hodge rightly taught that Arminians deny that God determines free willed actions whereas “Calvinists affirm that [God] foresees them to be certainly future because he has determined them to be so.” For Hodge, “the plan which determines general ends must also determine even the minutest element comprehended in the system of which those ends are parts.” (WCF 3.1.2)
Reformed theology entails not merely a doctrine of determinism but a principle of exhaustive determinism. Specifically, causal divine determinism is at the heart of Reformed theology.
As the label “causal divine determinism” suggests, adherence to a Reformed understanding of determinism does not consign one to a secular view of bare causal determinism let alone fatalism. Causal divine determinism does not contemplate impersonal laws of nature or relations of cause and effect that are intrinsically necessary. Nor does causal divine determinism mean that God always acts directly. Rather, “God…makes use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at His pleasure.” (WCF 5.2) Indeed, “second causes [aren’t] taken away, but rather established.” (WCF 3.1)
How exhaustively detailed is causal divine determinism?
The decree of God is so exceedingly all-encompassing that for Hodge God “determines the nature of events, and their mutual relations.” In other words, impersonal laws of cause and effect do not impinge upon God, for there are none! Rather, God gives all facts their meaning and in doing so determines how A would effect B. Surely God could have actualized a world in which the boiling point of water is other than it is!
Common examples – physical and metaphysical causal relationships:
If causal divine determinism is true, then God is not confined to work from mysteriously scripted means of possibility imposed by necessary conditional relationships that are intrinsically causal without reference to God’s free determinate counsel. No, God’s creativity is independent. God is the ultimate source of possibility.
Consider that liquid water freezes at 0 degrees C. (No need to get into pressure, additives, purity and nucleation centers etc.) Does God know this fact of nature according to his natural knowledge or his free knowledge? In other words, is this a necessary truth or could it have been different? What grounds such truth – God’s nature, his determinative will, or something external to God? From whence does God source the objects of his knowledge?
What do fish and ponds have to do with this?
Water at 4 degrees C is at its highest density, which means that at that precise point it will expand whether it is heated or cooled. Must that causal relationship necessarily hold true under identical circumstances? Or, could God have determined that water continue to become increasingly dense as it is cooled below 4 degrees C? Hopefully we recognize that God was not constrained to provide fish a safe haven in winter. God could have determined that the density of water continue to increase upon cooling it below 4 degrees C, in which case ice would not rise to the top.
God’s freedom relates to our freedom:
We can apply God’s creative decree to the analysis of human freedom as well. With respect to our doctrine of concurrence we can employ the same concepts of contingency, possibility, necessity and causality when considering how God knows the free choices of men. Indeed we should.
Given an identical state of affairs, God is free to determine that a fragrance or song from yesteryear causally produces a particular disposition to act freely. Yet the precise disposition of the will that would obtain is ultimately determined by God alone.
Under the same conditions (or relevant states of affairs) God can ensure any number of free choices. In the context of hearing a song, God can actualize that one causally, yet freely, looks at an old photo album, picks up the phone to call someone or something else. These alternative possibilities are not contingent upon libertarian creaturely freedom for their actualization, but rather they are true possibilities that God is free to determine as he purposes. Free moral agents participate with God’s purpose by divine decree and meticulous providence, and not by autonomous spontaneity of choice. The unhappy alternative is God’s foreknowledge is impinged upon by uninstantiated essences, making his sovereign purpose eternally reactive and opportunistic.
In short, God determines the free choices of men. Indeed he can do no other! Consequently, God’s exhaustive divine foreknowledge is based upon his having exhaustively determined whatsoever comes to past including the causes that incline the human will. For God to foreknow choices presupposes his determination of their antecedent causes. Yet no violation to the creature is entailed by God’s determination of antecedent causes. God’s determination of our choices is compatible with our freedom and responsibility. Notwithstanding, God must casually ensure the outcome in order to foreknow the outcome. Yet the outcome is consistent with the person, for God is good.
The current Reformed landscape:
Unfortunately but not surprisingly, a growing number of Calvinists are unwittingly libertarian Calvinists. Many affirm the “five points” yet believe that in other instances we are free to choose otherwise. The logical trajectory of such a philosophical-theology denies (a) the determinative basis for God’s exhaustive omniscience, (b) the future surety of his decree, and (c) God’s independence and unique eternality.
If Christians are not affirming causal divine determinism, they are implicitly denying that human freedom is compatible with God’s exhaustive determination of all things. Consequently, whether self-consciously or not, they are affirming a form of incompatibilism, which in the context of moral responsibility entails libertarian freedom. With libertarian freedom comes a theology proper that is highly improper, and a theory of responsibility that lacks moral grounding.
Let’s address some common misunderstandings along with some implications entailed by the denial of causal divine determinism:
- Free Will:
Can’t we choose otherwise, surely Adam could have!
How many times have we heard it? Maybe we’ve even said it!
To illustrate the disagreement on matters of the determinative decree as it relates to free will, consider the two quotes below.
Adam alone had the power of contrary choice. He lost it in the fall, making his will enslaved to sin.
Hence, all his posterity are enslaved to sin. Their will also is enslaved to sin.
A WELL KNOWN REFORMED PASTOR
I don’t know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God’s decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God’s decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.
JOHN FRAME
Kevin DeYoung is correct here, “Arminians argue that we have a libertarian free will, which simply put means that we have the power of contrary choice…” So, whether the other Reformed pastor understands this or not, he has asserted that before the fall Adam had freedom in the libertarian sense. Therefore, Frame or the pastor is incorrect, and it’s not Frame.*
Although those two opposing views might appear inconsequential because the prelapsarian state has expired, it’s worth addressing because the first quote is a common sentiment among theologically trained (as John notes) and has far reaching metaphysical and theological implications with respect to possibility, responsibility, truth-makers and truth-bearers, God’s exhaustive omniscience and more.
Regarding the view of the Reformed pastor – his point has significant consequences that transcend pre and post fall ontology. In other words, if Adam had libertarian freedom while in a state of innocence (as the pastor wrongly asserts), then there’s no reason to believe we don’t have such freedom today given that libertarian freedom is by definition not nature dependent. (That’s hardly controversial among philosophical theologians whether Reformed or not.) Needless to say, clarity within the Reformed tradition is needed and overdue.
Let’s be clear, if Adam could have freely chosen not to eat of the forbidden fruit, then God’s decree could have failed. God’s decree could not have failed. Therefore, Adam could not have freely chosen not to eat of the forbidden fruit. (Modus Tollens)
Regardless of the lapsarian state under consideration, even though free moral agents won’t ever choose contrary to God’s foreknowledge and decree, an ability to do so would undermine moral responsibility and betray orthodox theology proper.
If we can’t choose otherwise, how can we be free and responsible?
That we are responsible is indubitable. Therefore, if libertarian freedom is a philosophical surd, then from a Christian perspective free will is compatible with the determinative nature of God’s decree. In other words, our freedom is of another kind than the freedom to choose otherwise.
Without an intention to act there is no act of the will. When an act of the will occurs, the intentional choice is consummated. Both components of the choice obtain. An intention to act gives way to the actual act the intention contemplates. We may safely say the intention of the moral agent causes the act. The act is effected by the agent’s intention.
Now then, what causes an intention to act? If it’s a chosen intention, then what causes the intention to choose the intention to act? (Regress)
Agent causation?
Here’s a libertarian solution to the regress conundrum. It’s called agent causation. Rather than choosing our intentions, the agent simply causes it.
The ability to choose otherwise would destroy moral accountability, for how can the pure spontaneity of agent causation produce morally relevant choices? With agent causation comes a break in the causal nexus whereby the agent becomes the ultimate source of his intention to act. Such autonomous independence and regulative control would detach influence, reason, and relevant history from intentions and willed actions. By implication the agent rises above all influences, where-from a posture of dispositional equilibrium forms intentions from a functionally blank past. In other words, given the liberty of indifference that agent causation contemplates, choices would be unmapped to personal history, entailing a radical break from the person doing the choosing.
Nobody rationally determines intentions in a libertarian construct. There’d be no reason to guard the heart for we’d be able to kick bad habits spontaneously, according to a will that’s impervious to causal influences. Such radical spontaneity would result in pure randomness of choice, destroying moral relevance by detaching choice from person. In a split moment we should expect to see saints behaving like devils, and devils like saints. The implications of non-decretive metaphysical contingency of choice demand it! Any libertarian appeal to will formation doesn’t comport with libertarian freedom. Libertarians may not have their cake and eat it too.
* The popular Reformed pastor might be confusing WCF 9.2 with “the power of contrary choice”, which is libertarian freedom.
WCF 9.2: “Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it.”
That Adam could fall does not imply that Adam could choose contrary to how he would choose. Yet if Adam had libertarian freedom, then he could have chosen contrary to how he did. But if Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did, then Adam could have chosen contrary to God’s decree. The only question left is, could he have?
We can leave the fall out of it. If Adam had libertarian freedom, then prior to the fall he could have chosen to name the animals differently than he did – differently than God decreed he would!
Freedom and power happily comply with compatibilist freedom as discussed above, whereas contrary choice is the hallmark of libertarian freedom.
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Friends, Not Enemies
Today, many Christian theologians see themselves as principally opposed to philosophy so that they can build a theology largely devoid of any extrabiblical influence. Whether they embrace the label or not, this is a kind of “biblicism” that fails to appreciate or employ the right use of reason and the tools of philosophy. The major problem with such an approach—and there are many—is that it fails to account for the nature of Scripture’s own testimony to the philosophy according to Christ within the context of a Christian view. As we have seen, one cannot escape philosophy. The question becomes whether one must always, in the nature of the case, carry out philosophy ‘outside’ of Christ, or if one can do philosophy under the Lordship of Christ and his Word.
Theology, when done rightly, necessitates philosophy; and philosophy, when done truthfully, requires theology. Theology is, after all, “Queen of the Sciences.”[1] In their broadest senses, theology and philosophy are the same thing.[2] Every level and specific application of theology uses the tools of philosophy. The preeminence of Christ also entails an ultimately theological basis for philosophy. In this article, I hope to show that good philosophy is a necessary and Christ-exalting ally to theology.
When I say theology and philosophy are the “same thing,” I refer to their subject matter and much of their methodology. I do not mean that they are impossible to differentiate from one another once one moves beyond their broad definitions or that the two are necessarily or absolutely identical. As one progresses to more fine-grained understandings of each discipline, differences do arise. The relation between theology and philosophy is thus worth exploring further, even if that relation is admittedly difficult to articulate.
Theology and Philosophy are Friends, Not Enemies
Philosophy is technically the love of wisdom, while theology is the study of God. But these definitions are broad and etymological in nature. Philosophy is traditionally divided into metaphysics (What is the nature of reality?), epistemology (How do we know?), and ethics (How ought we live?)—with subdivisions within each. Everything has a philosophy. For example, there is philosophy of language, art, mathematics, history, and science. As Alvin Plantinga once quipped, philosophy is essentially thinking hard about something. Perhaps the harder one thinks about various topics, the better a philosopher that individual is. Philosophy, then, pertains to every topic a human being might possibly think about. If a subject can be thought of, then a philosophy of that subject exists.
Like philosophy, theology can be divided into various branches. Exegetical, systematic, biblical, historical, analytic, contemplative, philosophical, pastoral, and practical are all different types of theology (although not everyone agrees upon each of these). Nevertheless, like philosophy, theology is thinking about something in its relation to God, whether politics, education, marriage, or childrearing. Accordingly, there does not appear to be anything that cannot be thought of in relation to God. Philosophy and theology are thus, at the very least, alike in many ways. Not only do they both pertain to anything that may be thought about, but they address much the same subject matter.
In this way, then, we might even say that there is no ultimate difference between philosophy and theology. Why? Because God is the truly wise one. And any philosopher who truly seeks wisdom will arrive at God.[3] Equally, any faithful theologian will think his thoughts after God. Indeed, one might think hard about any topic in its relation to God such that philosophy and theology are virtually indistinguishable from one another. As mentioned above, it would nevertheless be a mistake to think of the two disciplines as identical. Upon closer examination, the terms “philosophy” and “theology” are used as descriptors of particular activities in virtue of degree of their relations to either thought itself or to God. A Socratic dialogue might, for example, take into account the question and nature of life after death but be considered “philosophy” rather than “theology.” Yet when the Apostle Paul writes about life after death, it is generally understood to be theology rather than philosophy. The strength of “rather than” is not absolute, but admits of degrees. In truth Socrates is doing both philosophy and theology, even if his theology does lead us to the one, true and living God. Equally, Paul is doing both theology and philosophy, as his cogitation about God leads him to a true philosophy of life.
In this way, we can see how philosophy and theology—or is it theology and philosophy? —are friends, not enemies. That being the case, their emphases as well as their contexts differ significantly. For this reason, room exists for differentiating philosophy and theology, but not at the expense of their shared properties or, when related rightly, their symbiotic relationship. Indeed, the best theologians and the best theology regularly rely on doing philosophy, and that is what I will now consider.
Theology Requires Philosophy at Every Level
Obviously, if theology and philosophy are friends and not enemies, then theology will be found partnering with and depending upon philosophy at every level. Again, this is true in general, but it is also true when theology is much more narrowly defined. Indeed, every specific application of theology will rely in some sense upon the use of philosophy. Let’s consider a few examples.
For starters, exegetical theology requires a philosophy of language, biblical theology requires a philosophy of history, and systematic theology requires the philosophical discipline of logic. At the same time, a proper understanding of language, history, and logic are only possible given what theology says about them by way of its explication of divine revelation.[4] Theology, then, rather than philosophy, is always closer to the principium in play (that is, the most basic principles).[5] Even if theology and philosophy overlap as described above, it does not follow that the content or conclusions of all theology and philosophy are good or true, nor does it follow that all uses of philosophy in a methodological sense are consistent with the first principles of Christian theology.[6]
This means that theology requires philosophy at every level without depending upon philosophical argument in any pre-dogmatic sense. In other words, theology that coheres with biblical revelation must never submit to philosophies sourced from ideologies developed independent of God’s Word. Instead, true theology and true philosophy must always treat Scripture as first order.[7] While philosophy (thinking hard about something) will be present in every theological inquiry, it is important to distinguish philosophy as servant from philosophy as master.
Rightly Relating Philosophy and Theology
If we accept the claim that philosophy is a servant and not a master (with sources unto itself), then this will have sweeping implications for personal faith and apologetics, especially as it relates to natural theology. For consider the implications set forth by philosopher Michael Sudduth: “The pre-dogmatic function of natural theology . . . entails a more positive use of theistic arguments to establish the faith. Here reason has become a principium of the dogmatic system.
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Cedo Nulli: The Minister and His Master
True ministers yield to none because they answer to One. Like Paul they can say “do I seek to please men? for if I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ…(Galatians 1:10). True ministers are men who count it a very small thing to be judged of men for “he that judgeth me is the Lord (1 Corinthians 4:4).”
The first business of the Minister of the gospel is to honour his Master. After all, the minister has been appointed by God. He is an under shepherd. The Master is Jesus. The Lord of the house is Jesus. The church, then, is His house not the minister’s house. There is One King; and so the servant—or pastor—who has been given charge over the church must concern himself first and foremost with honouring his Master.
When the preacher is sorting out what to preach or write you don’t want him consulting man. You don’t want him taking polls from the congregation, or consulting with the lusts of his own flesh. You want him alone in the place of prayer—Bible open—consulting God.
Everything He does is first for the Lord Jesus. Everything is to honour Him. He preaches to get glory and praise for Christ. He rules and governs and labours and serves to bring glory to God. Popularity, the praise of man, and the favour of the world, are all as nothing to him… he courts the praise of but One.
He lives for an audience of but One. He answers to One.
There is something about Moses coming down from the mount to speak to the people that should be found in every minister—we are to be men who come from the mount of communion with God to speak to men. We are messengers…our whole reason for being as ministers is to labour for the honour of Jesus Christ. And so while it may not be considered diplomatic or politically correct or even prudent to speak (or write) of this thing or the other thing, we will speak it anyway. We will preach the whole counsel of God and hold nothing back.
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On the Argument to Pastoral Concerns
In the end, the pastoral thing to do is to point people to Christ and to call them to faithfulness in him. If we think Jesus has put things in place that matter for the local church, being pastoral must mean faithfully standing on those things Christ has called the church to stand on. It cannot be pastoral to encourage people to set aside Jesus’ commands and to say they simply do not matter. The pastoral implications of doing that, I would argue, are far worse.
I am often unsure what to make of people, faced with teaching from scripture, want to encourage us to consider the “pastoral implications”. Whether it be facing the biblical teaching on marriage and its implications for same-sex attracted people, the doctrine of complementarianism and its implications for gender roles or that vexed issue of the ordinances and who it is appropriate to welcome into the church and what is demanded on those who would seek to be welcomed. All of these are examples of teaching on which the Bible has something specific to say but some are keen to encourage us to be aware, and even to moderate what we perceive to be the biblical position, based on “pastoral concerns”.
My major concern with the call to be mindful of the pastoral implications is that it so often sounds to me like a call to set aside what the bible clearly teaches on a matter so we can make people who will not abide by it feel more comfortable. Of course, I would love it if a church altered its position on any number of things to align with my views and welcome me. But I, ironically, wouldn’t want to join the church that did that in the face of what it actually believed on the matter at hand. A church willing to change its position in the face of what it thinks the Bible is teaching in order to welcome those who see no reason to abide by such things is not, in my view, being faithful. It is placing the desire to welcome over and above what the Lord explicitly commands and sets aside the very grounds by which Jesus says we ought not to welcome.
Of course, everyone agrees with this when it concerns matters they reckon to be sinful. You don’t get many genuine evangelicals arguing that our churches should become affirming despite teaching clearly about Jesus’ views on marriage and same-sex relationships. Their uniform understanding of what is and is not sin in these circumstances mean most are quite ready to say that we ought not to welcome those who would ride roughshod over the commands of Christ in this area.
The issue tends to come when one party considers a matter one of sin and faithfulness while the other does not. The argument in such circumstances boils down to I do not find this sinful so you should welcome me. There seems to be little recognition that I might find it sinful so cannot welcome you if you refuse to acknowledge it is so.
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