Ronald William Di Giacomo

R.C. Sproul vs The Westminster Divines on the Christian Sabbath

Are we to infer that God commands us not to work on the Sabbath in order that we might enjoy 21st century entertainment on the Lord’s Day? Are all non-work lawful pleasures that are suitable for Saturdays somehow appropriate for Sunday? Did God command rest for one day in seven so that 21st century moms and dads would be free on Sundays to take their children to their soccer games? It should be apparent, the Divines did not base their view of Sabbath recreation solely on Isaiah 58:13-14. 

R.C. Sproul cites three so-called “controversies” in church history surrounding the Christian Sabbath. Is the Sabbath obligatory for the New Testament Church? If it is, should the Sabbath continue to be the seventh day of the week, the first day of the week, or is the day of the week up for grabs. Thirdly, Sproul raises a difference of opinion within the church regarding Sabbath recreation and acts of mercy. So, Sproul cites two defeated views, then fastens his wagon to a third. I’ll address them one-by-one.
Obligatory nature of the Sabbath
“Augustine, for example, believed that nine of the Ten Commandments (the so-called “moral law” of the Old Testament) were still intact and imposed obligations upon the Christian church… Augustine was persuaded that the Old Testament Sabbath law had been abrogated. Others have argued that because the Sabbath was instituted originally not in the Mosaic economy but in creation, it maintains its status of moral law as long as the creation is intact.”
There’s no doubt, Augustine was the theological giant of his day. However, Augustine lived 1600 years ago and anyone holding to his theology today could not be ordained in a Reformed Presbyterian church. That speaks to how far God has brought his church.
Many giants have stood on Augustine’s shoulders. Yet today’s Reformed church, with its elevated line to truth on the horizon, repudiates several of Augustine’s theological positions such as paedocommunion, the classification of non-elect regenerate persons, the abrogation of the Sabbath principle and more.
Of course, there are always theological “controversies” in the church but controversy does not lend credence to a defeated view held by an otherwise notable theologian of his day. That Augustine reduced the Ten Commandants to nine merely corroborates the Reformed understanding of the progressive doctrinal illumination of the church. We should expect that doctrine has been refined from Augustine’s day, through the time of the Protestant Reformation, to this very day within the Reformed tradition. Accordingly, any reference to Augustine that gives credence to a non-confessional Sabbath view gives equal credence to paedocommunion and losing one’s salvation, which resurfaced without warm ecclesiastical welcome in the fleeting phase of Federal Vision.
Saturday, Sunday or any day?
“The second major controversy is the question about the day of the week on which the Sabbath is to be observed. Some insist that… since the Old Testament Israelites celebrated the Sabbath on the seventh day of the week, which would be Saturday, we should follow that pattern.”
Sproul gives no details of who was embroiled in the controversy, so it’s hard to comment. As for today it’s safe to say that the Millerite movement that culminated in the Seventh-day Adventist sect and the teachings of its former prophetess, Ellen White, have no seat at the Reformed table. Nor do Saturday Sabbath cults like those that embrace Armstrongism and House of Yahwey heresies, or views held within the Hebrews Roots movement.
But back to basics. What is the relevance of citing the defeated side of a settled “controversy” by an appeal to a particular theologian? Would we lend credence to slavery because an otherwise notable statesman owned slaves? That a particular theologian (past or present) disagrees with the church might be interesting but it is neither surprising nor seemingly relevant.
Indeed, if it is one’s intention to lend credence to doctrines that lost the debate by citing notable theologians who were on the wrong side of the church, then how far might we take this approach? Should we revisit the credibility of the “transubstantiation of the mass” because Thomas Aquinas was sound on other doctrine? Where is Sproul hoping to lead us? Controversial debate might create doubt in the minds of the less theologically grounded, but can it lend credence to either side of an issue, especially to the losing side in a progressively illuminated church?
“John Calvin argued that it would be legitimate to have the Sabbath day on any day if all of the churches would agree, because the principle in view was the regular assembling of the saints for corporate worship and for the observation of rest.”
Well, Calvin didn’t have the benefit of the Westminster Divines as it relates to their mature thought on the Regulative Principle of Worship, Christian Liberty of Conscience and Religious Worship and the Sabbath Day, which through theological synthesis overturns the view that the church may determine which day in seven can be constituted as the Lord’s Day. The Divines with good reason rejected Articles XX and XXXIV of the church of England. Again, what’s the point of the history lesson?
How does historical controversy lend credence to, or cast doubt upon, settled error and in this particular case on the church’s alleged right to dictate religious rites and holy days?
Recreation and Acts of Mercy
“Within the Reformed tradition, the most significant controversy that has appeared through the ages is the question of how the Sabbath is to be observed. There are two major positions within the Reformed tradition on this question. To make matters simple, we will refer to them as the Continental view of the Sabbath and the Puritan view of the Sabbath.”
Tagging with an impressive label a non-confessional view might give people a subjective sense of theological backing but it cannot provide objective confessional or ecclesiastical backing. Moreover, as church historian and professor R. Scott Clark has argued, this rejected view, commonly referred to as “the Continental view” of the Sabbath, is thought by some to entail spurious revisionism. Or as Dr. Clark would have it:

“There was no consciousness in the classical period of a distinctly “British” or ‘Continental’ view of anything. There was simply an international Reformed theology, piety, and practice.”

See also the Synod of Dort on sabbath observance:
“This same day is thus consecrated for divine worship, so that in it one might rest from all servile works (with these excepted, which are works of charity and pressing necessity) and from those recreations which impede the worship of God.”
Back to Sproul:
“The Puritan view argues against the acceptability of recreation on the Sabbath day. The text most often cited to support this view is Isaiah 58:13-14…The crux of the matter in this passage is the prophetic critique of people doing their own pleasure on the Sabbath day. The assumption that many make with respect to this text is that doing one’s own pleasure must refer to recreation. If this is the case, the prophet Isaiah was adding new dimensions to the Old Testament law with respect to Sabbath-keeping.”
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Faith and Justification in the Life of Infants

Although I am of the mind that it is normative for covenant children to be born again and brought forth as the fruit of the new creation by the intelligible Word that is accompanied by even minimal understanding, whenever the Word raises sinners unto life it is always accompanied by the operative work of the Spirit who is free to work apart from the comprehended Word in the experience of infants. (John 3:8; James 1:18; 1 Peter 1:23) Surely, it is plain vanilla Reformed doctrine that God can regenerate covenant children in the womb or even at the font (even if it is not normative), but those who have been united to Christ in this way shall surely come to receive and embrace the teachings of Scripture, in particular the person and work of Christ, all in God’s appointed time. We can expect this to occur early in the regenerate child’s experience.

In Chapter 14 of the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF), saving faith is distinguished from believing. This distinction, which has implications with respect to infants and those who might suffer from cognitive impairment, is made plain when the standards teach it is by the grace of faith that the elect are enabled to believe to the saving of their souls. (WCF 14.1) Moreover, in WCF 14 we read:
By this faith, a Christian believes to be true whatsoever is revealed in the word…
WCF 14.2
WCF 14.1 does not teach that by the grace of faith a Christian is enabled to have faith. Nor do the standards teach in WCF 14.2 that by this faith the Christian has faith. Rather, the Confession recognizes that the gift of faith is not the same thing as exercising faith in the act of believing. Similarly, the grace of repentance in the Westminster standards is distinguished from the acts of repentance.
Repentance unto life is an evangelical grace, the doctrine whereof is to be preached by every minister of the Gospel, as well as that of faith in Christ. By it [i.e., the gift of repentance], a sinner, out of the sight and sense not only of the danger, but also of the filthiness and odiousness of his sins… hates his sins, as to turn from them all unto God, purposing and endeavoring to walk with Him in all the ways of His commandments.
WCF 15.1.2
It is by the the gift of repentance that sinners are enabled to turn from their sin in specific acts of repentance. This is analogous to acts of believing flowing out of the one time gift of faith.
Given this unavoidable nuance, we can understand that when an adult Christian is sleeping, suffers from severe cognizant impairment, or becomes unconscious by slipping into a coma, the saint is not without the implanted gifts of faith and repentance even if he can no longer exercise those gifts in believing or turning in faith. However, unlike with infants who also can have dormant gifts of faith and repentance, such adults have volitionally received and rested in Christ alone. Infants have not.
By parsing (a) gifts of faith and repentance alongside of (b) the resultant acts of believing and repenting, we can now better consider justifying faith in elect infants. 
We just saw that it is by the grace of repentance and faith that sinners are enabled to repent and believe. Moreover, like the grace of repentance, the gift of faith is also a necessary and immediate result of regeneration. Which is to say, no regenerate person (even an infant) is without a new and irrevocable nature that possesses the newborn capacity (or propensity) to respond to the gospel in turning and trusting. Added to this, the standards correctly teach that “elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated, and saved by Christ, through the Spirit, who works when, and where and how he pleases…” In such cases, the outward call that effects the inward call unto regeneration is bypassed, which God is free to do.
Putting This Together:
We are safe to infer that if God can regenerate elect infants who die in infancy, he is free to regenerate elect infants who don’t. (Whether that is normative for elect covenant children is not my concern quite yet.) It is also safe to infer that all regenerate infants are granted the seed of repentance and faith (even without the cognitive ability to willfully turn and trust), lest there can be new creations in Christ, indwelled by the Holy Spirit, who do not have the grace of new life that is accompanied by the propensity to repent and believe the gospel. Notwithstanding and, also, per the Westminster standards, effectual calling (as a matter of definition) entails knowledge of Christ and his work, whereby sinners become effectually and cognizantly persuaded of the need to embrace the Savior.
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The Reformed Doctrine of Divine Foreknowledge – A Call for a Coherent and Unified Voice

Molinists and Reformed thinkers agree that God knows all possible counterfactuals of creaturely freedom according to his natural knowledge. In this regard, the significant difference between the two schools of thought is that from a Molinist perspective God’s natural knowledge does not inform him of which possibilities can be made actual. In other words, from a distinctly Molinist perspective God must look to his middle knowledge because not all possibilities can be actualized due to a different understanding of how God’s determination would relate to human freedom and moral accountability. In other words, because Molinism opts for libertarian freedom rather than a Reformed view of compatibilist freedom, there are infinite possibilities that God cannot make actual because they are out of his control. Molinists call such possibilities “infeasibilities”, yet they’re still philosophically (metaphysically) possible.

If the Reformed faith is God’s deposit of the purest doctrine in the 21st century, then being walled in by Reformed confessional theology can keep one believing true doctrine. Thankfully and in God’s kind providence, we have Reformed confessions and catechisms to guide us theologically and provide protection against believing false doctrine. However, merely believing true doctrine and actually knowing true doctrine entails vastly different propositional attitudes. It’s not hard to appreciate that believing in the Reformed doctrines of grace because the Westminster standards teach them is not on par with knowing the doctrines of grace because we’ve seen them for ourselves in the Scriptures. It’s hardly controversial that if our belief in any theological doctrine reduces merely to subscribing to it without sufficient reason, our doctrinal conviction will be either (a) as weak as our understanding of it, or else (b) factiously inflated. Either way – whether we have no clear conviction or spurious conviction – we cannot but lack cognizant doctrinal assurance.
Even though we may have come to the Reformed faith having seen for ourselves predestination in the Scriptures, we should guard against growing comfortable with a Reformed adaptation of the Roman Catholic notion of implicit faith (fides implicita) with respect to the rest of our confessional theology. However, not only should we not be theologically credulous – neither should we be skeptical when we approach the church’s teachings. Rather, we should recognize that although post-apostolic teachings may err and have erred, Christ’s promise to build his church upon the teachings of Scripture presupposes that by attending to the church’s teaching we can lay hold of true doctrine and the substance of genuine Christian piety and practice. Accordingly, through prayerful study and the church’s teaching, we may be confident that we can arrive at the church’s doctrine set forth in Scripture as we attend to the Scripture’s teaching that is embedded in the catholic creeds and Reformed confessions.
God’s Foreknowledge
Although the Reformed doctrine of the divine foreknowledge is not attended to with the scholastic care it once was, there are nonetheless contemporary doctors in the church who ably defend the doctrine against aberrant views that can appear quite enticing. (See James Anderson and Greg Welty.) Notwithstanding, because Reformed institutions today have in large part not seen the need to bring the Reformed tradition into dialogue with contemporary analytic philosophy, those teachers are relatively few. As a result, capable Reformed students can be left with a superficial philosophical-theology if not an incorrect understanding of how to defend against the sophistication and growing influence of modern day Molinism.
What’s at stake?
Before getting into terms of art and an interaction with the contemporary Reformed landscape, it should be appreciated at the outset that the Reformed doctrine of God’s creative decree as it relates to divine foreknowledge and free will are the most distinguishing features of the Reformed faith when compared to all other evangelical traditions. Furthermore, given the interdependence between theological concepts, in particular the doctrines of God and his works, a fragile grasp of either will necessarily lead to a lack of clarity about the other (if we are consistent).
Finally, the name most associated with Molinism is William Lane Craig. In Craig’s estimation:
[Molinism is] one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever conceived. For it would serve to explain not only God’s knowledge of the future, but divine providence and predestination as well…
Although I differ with Dr. Craig’s viewpoint, on some level I do appreciate his enthusiasm. Any Calvinist who is thoroughly acquainted with Molinism recognizes that it provides a robust view of divine sovereignty while offering a view of free will that is attractive to most. Notwithstanding, it is my conviction that only the theological determinism of the Reformed tradition can reconcile God’s exhaustive omniscience and human freedom. In particular, a deeper appreciation for God’s free knowledge can lead to radically profound reflections over the sovereign determination of contingent truths pertaining to creation, providence and grace, while simultaneously rendering the supposed profundity of Molinism utterly fruitless.
Taxonomy
Before interacting with the thoughts of Paul Helm, who has been considered by many to be the go-to Reformed philosophical expert in the doctrines of decree and providence, it might be helpful to consider some terms and concepts when it comes to God’s exhaustive omniscience. Without being familiar with specific terms of art, it will be difficult to understand Helm and just how generally disunited the Reformed camp is in trading in settled philosophical jargon, which in turn makes dialogue with skilled, yet opposing, Christian philosophers like J.P Moreland and William Lane Craig more challenging than necessary.
Natural Knowledge, a very good place to start:
Natural knowledge is God’s knowledge of all necessary truths. What this means is that God’s natural knowledge includes those things that are impossible not to be true, such as the law of non-contradiction (LNC) and God’s attributes. For example, there is no possibility that an object while being a rock is not a rock (LNC), or that God can be other than holy (divine attribute). We might observe up front that objects of natural knowledge are true without God willing them to be so. Rather, objects of natural knowledge are true because they are grounded in God’s unwilled nature. In addition to these sorts of necessary truths, God also knows all possibilities according to his natural knowledge. From a distinctly Reformed perspective, God’s natural knowledge of all possibilities correlates to God’s self-knowledge of what he can do. Which is to say, God can actualize all possibilities, which is not a tenet of Molinism.
Free Knowledge
In addition to God’s natural knowledge, God has free knowledge. Unlike natural knowledge, free knowledge is logically predicated upon God’s creative decree. A comparative example might be useful here. God knew that Tyre and Sidon would not repent because he freely willed that they would not repent. Consequently, God’s knowledge regarding Tyre and Sidon, from a distinctly Reformed perspective, was predicated upon his sovereign determination, which is unlike God’s passive knowledge of his holiness. What is perhaps less obvious in this regard is that God did not only determine the hardness of heart found in Tyre and Sidon, but also the counterfactual truth that had certain miracles been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented. So, although the counterfactual of Tyre and Sidon’s repentance was not decreed actually to occur in history, it was no less determined that: had certain miracles been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented. We may refer to such counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as would-counterfactuals. The takeaway is simply this. From a Reformed perspective, objects of free knowledge don’t just include determined things that will occur but, also, determined things that would occur if certain states of affairs were to obtain (even if they won’t). Consequently, although all would-counterfactuals are objects of God’s omniscience (specifically, God’s free knowledge), not all are foreknown as future. In other words, some counterfactuals are determined merely to be true, whereas others are determined actually to occur. An additional example might be useful in making the point. God decreed that I’d write this piece at precisely this time under certain conditions. However, if God also knows what I would have done had I been distracted by a phone call while writing, then that bit of additional knowledge would be according to his free knowledge of an independently determined counterfactual. In other words, God would not know what I would have done under other circumstances according to natural knowledge but via his free knowledge.*
Consistent Reformed thinkers, a summary of sort:
An entailment of Reformed thought is that the free choices men would make in any situation are divinely determined and, consequently, a result of God’s creative decree. With this understanding comes a recognition that would-counterfactuals, which God freely knows, are in a qualified sense a subset of counterfactual possibilities that God knows according to his natural knowledge. This means that from a Reformed perspective, would-counterfactuals are contingent truths which God freely determines, whereas the set of possibilities from which God chooses to make them true are necessary truths grounded in God’s self-knowledge of what he can actualize.** As 19th century Princeton theologian A.A. Hodge would correctly have it – God determines the relationship of cause to effect. In other words, for Hodge it is the decree of God that makes even contingent events contingent!
The decree, instead of altering, determines the nature of events, and their mutual relations. It makes free actions free in relation to their agents, and contingent events contingent in relation to their conditions.
In other words, God pre-interprets the particulars and wills their relationship of cause and effect. Consequently, true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are objects of God’s creative decree and consequently posterior to it.
Agreement and disagreement between opposing camps:
Molinists and Reformed thinkers agree that God knows all possible counterfactuals of creaturely freedom according to his natural knowledge. In this regard, the significant difference between the two schools of thought is that from a Molinist perspective God’s natural knowledge does not inform him of which possibilities can be made actual. In other words, from a distinctly Molinist perspective God must look to his middle knowledge because not all possibilities can be actualized due to a different understanding of how God’s determination would relate to human freedom and moral accountability.
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Denial, Pre-commitments and Roman Catholicism

Beliefs have consequences, false commitments held tenaciously over time (often for self-preservation) can lead to devastating results. Beliefs spill over to all of life, especially core beliefs (or presuppositions).

An amusing illustration of interpreting evidence in light of precommitment has to do with a deluded man who thinks he is dead. The doctor tries to persuade the man he is not dead by getting the man to reason according to some other
proposition the dead man also believes, such as: dead men don’t bleed. Therefore, if when pricked with a needle by the doctor blood comes out of the deluded patient, the patient should abandon his belief that he is dead; or so is the doctor’s hope.
We might comprise a simple syllogism that the patient would readily embrace.
1. Dead men won’t bleed when pricked
2. I am a dead man
3. I won’t bleed when pricked
Naturally, when pricked the man bled. Perhaps naively, the doctor thought that after seeing the falsity of 3 his patient would abandon his commitment to 2. Of course he doesn’t. His precommitment to 2, being dead, is too strong. As the illustration typically goes, the patient adjusts his less consequential belief, in this case the major premise. Rather than admit he’s not dead, he is only willing to say, “I guess dead men do bleed.”
Although the illustration serves its purpose, things are often much worse in real life. Fortunately or unfortunately (depending upon one’s perspective) people don’t readily adjust their beliefs like that. A person who is committed to 2 would not likely forgo 1 that quickly. He needs 1 to help convince him of 2. Sadly, people can cultivate denial without having to modify previous beliefs. With enough practice, people can become quite skilled in denial as it relates to commitment to false beliefs, especially when the beliefs strike at how one defines himself or herself.
Downward trek…
As we saw, instead of being persuaded by blood from a pinprick, the person who is committed to being dead may feel the need to maintain his commitment to 1 too. If so, he will not adjust his reasoning as it relates to his major premise according to the evidence of blood. In other words, he will not deny his major premise and concede that dead men do bleed. Rather, he may “rationally” try to maintain 1 as he goes deeper into denial but in another direction. He can manipulate the evidence that is against him rather than adjust 1 according to his undeniable blood. From this posture he can dismiss the evidence in one of two ways. He can believe that it is blood, but not his blood, or else he can believe that red fluid came from his corpse but that it’s not blood at all!
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No, I *AM* Spiritually Closer With Evangelicals Who Reject Certain Tenets Of “Classical Theism” Than With Classical Trinitarians Who Reject The Reformed Doctrine Of Justification.

Fellowship among evangelicals will always be along a vast theological continuum of spiritual closeness whereas with devout Roman Catholics spiritual closeness is a binary consideration. There is none. Let us not confuse sanctification and fellowship within the body with evangelizing those outside the evangelical church. Our personal spiritual affinity toward other professing Christians should be walled in by their objective ecclesiastical standing, which is based upon baptism and a credible profession of faith before the elders of a true church that preaches the biblical gospel.  In a word, how can evangelicals enjoy spiritual closeness with Roman Catholics when they are not to be admitted to the Lord’s table?

I will interact with portions of this article by Professor Carl Trueman.
A recovery of classical theology also raises an interesting ecumenical question. Why do Protestants, especially those of an evangelical stripe, typically prioritize the doctrine of salvation over the doctrine of God? If an evangelical rejects simplicity or impassibility or eternal generation, he is typically free to do so. But why should those properly committed to the creeds and confessions consider that person closer spiritually to them than those who affirm classical theism but share a different understanding of justification?
I am committed to the catholic creeds and Reformed confessions. Maybe that is why I find it interesting that we are being asked to consider why those committed to the creeds and confessions (like myself) can enjoy more spiritual closeness with those who reject certain tenets of classical theism (like certain evangelicals) than with others who have “a different understanding of justification” (like devout Roman Catholics). In other words, in the context of spiritual closeness we are asked to compare (a) an evangelical’s rejection of “simplicity or impassibility or eternal generation” to, what is framed as, (b) a mere “different understanding of justification”. (Let that sink in.)
Many things jump out at me. First, should we infer that a “different understanding of justification” does not entail a rejection of the true and Reformed doctrine of justification? Such an inference seems unwarranted. After all, how much can we differ on the Reformed doctrine of justification and still hold to the gospel? (Given the later comparative reference to Roman Catholic Dominicans, who are to be considered orthodox in their doctrine of God, it is apparent that what is being called a “different understanding of justification” does not cash out as any mere theological difference but an outright repudiation of the gospel of Jesus Christ.)
Would it not be fairer to evaluate the foundational basis for spiritual fellowship between a confessional Reformed believer (like myself) with either of these two different classes of people: (1) those who cannot accept and, therefore, reject the philosophical underpinnings and subsequent implications of certain constructs of, for instance, divine simplicity (e.g., Alvin Plantinga), and (2) those who reject the simplicity of the gospel as it relates to a Reformed doctrine of justification (e.g., any of the popes since the sixteenth century)?
Before reading on, it might be helpful to internalize that the idea that we should not prioritize the doctrine of justification over the doctrine of God can imply that we should not prioritize God’s grace over the God of grace. Although a worthy reflection in its own right, one can easily miss the point if it’s abstracted from the present context. We aren’t to be prioritizing complementary doctrines in the abstract but rather discerning which doctrines are absolutely essential to understand and embrace for there to be the possibility of “spiritual closeness” in the household of faith.
Back to Basics:
Although the doctrines of simplicity, impassibility and eternal generation are glorious truths to be cherished and defended, we may not deny that the basis for genuine spiritual closeness (i.e., true fellowship in the Lord) is union with Christ by the Holy Spirit and agreement over gospel truth. Accordingly, it is no small matter that entrance into that spiritual oneness is gospel wrought conversion, which eludes official Roman Catholic doctrine according to confessional Protestant standards. In a word, one cannot possibly enjoy spiritual closeness with a Roman Catholic who is true to Roman Catholicism. Therefore, no matter how pristine a Roman Catholic’s theology proper is, there’s no possibility of Christian fellowship for those who truly reject the Reformed doctrine of justification.
Simplicity Isn’t as Simple as the Gospel;
Regarding the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), some of its loudest proponents have identified and acknowledged different implicit difficulties having to do with (a) God’s absolute freedom as it relates to the necessity of the divine decree, (b) personal properties of divine persons as they relate to a non-composite being, and (c) the intelligibility of divine attributes being one and the same attribute due to the transitive nature of the law of identity (just to name a few conundrums). Others have hedged on certain tenets of DDS while claiming to affirm the doctrine. And even others simply have hand-waved while labeling evangelicals who disagree with them as dangerous if not heretical. (To varying degrees we can cite similar observations about eternal generation and impassibility.)
Surely divine simplicity, impassibility and eternal generation do not just jump off the pages of Scripture. That is not to say these doctrines aren’t imbedded in Scripture and cannot be inferred by careful study. But that seems to miss the point about Christian fellowship. To understand the gospel and be genuinely converted one needn’t understand how God, not being made up of parts, can be three distinct persons yet one divine being. One can be genuinely converted and enjoy spiritual closeness with other regenerate believers without having considered, let alone reconciled (a) orthodox conceptual distinctions about God that are understood analogically with (b) how God cannot be a composite being (either logically, metaphysically, or physically). Moreover, if God is creator and redeemer, then how might we address challenges relating to God taking on accidental properties? And if God is “most free” yet the divine will is timelessly eternal, then how could God have created another world in place of this one? Or is the logical trajectory of DDS that God has actualized all possible worlds? How might the average born again believer in the pew, with whom I can enjoy spiritual closeness in Christ over the forgiveness of sins, answer the question of whether God has unactualized potential?
Of course there’s a difference between not having an opinion on x and having a reasoned rejection of x. However, if one does not believe that a sophisticatedly developed conscious-rejection of these philosophical constructs is sufficient to undermine a credible profession of faith, then why not consider those who mistakenly reject these loftier doctrines, while affirming the evangelical gospel, as standing more solidly on fellowship ground than all the Thomists within Rome who reject the simplicity of the gospel? Yet if it is believed salvation hinges in part upon not rejecting simplicity, impassibility or eternal generation, then we would not have elevated Roman Catholics who decidedly oppose sola fide above such professing Protestants. We would merely have placed them on equal ground! Neither sort would be spiritually closer than the other to a true believer.
Although I have not been satisfied with some of the representations I’ve heard from some of the most vocal defenders of DDS, I do believe there are adequate answers to such questions even though some strident proponents of DDS seem to struggle with arguments levied by the ablest objectors to DDS. But the point isn’t whether divine simplicity, impassability or the eternal generation of the Son are glorious truths over which we can fellowship with other true believers. (Indeed we can!) Rather, the point is merely this. I am much “closer spiritually” with (a) an evangelical who sadly rejects DDS because he has not found the arguments he has read particularly persuasive, than with (b) a Thomist who believes in the transubstantiation of the mass and that his works of piety can assist in meriting his justification. (In this example, the evangelical needs further spiritual understanding, whereas the Thomist is in need of spiritual conversion.)
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Christian, No, You May not Marry that Roman Catholic (or any other Roman Catholic for that matter)

No matter what a Roman Catholic’s verbal profession is, both the Roman communion and the Reformed church charge Roman Catholics not to partake of the Lord’s Supper in a Protestant church. On that, Rome and Westminster concur! (Code of Canon Law, Can. 844 §1) Accordingly, how can one be regarded as having a credible profession of faith in Christ if he is forbidden in the Lord to commune with professing believers at Christ’s Supper? 

Christians may marry only in the Lord. This means that at the very least Christians may not marry faithful Roman Catholics, Muslims or any other unbelieving idolater, all of whom maintain damnable heresies. (1 Corinthians 7:39; WCF 24.3; See also: Exodus 34:16; Deuteronomy 7:3,4; 2 Corinthians 6:14-18)
A question that in more recent times accompanies this clear teaching of the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF) pertains to true believers within the Roman Catholic communion. Specifically, may Christians marry unfaithful Roman Catholics – those who profess the saving power of the gospel in their lives while remaining formally estranged to the Christian church while comfortably seated in Rome.What is behind such a question is a misunderstanding of (a) the relevance of the visible church, (b) the impropriety of private judgments in such matters and (c) the undue partitioning of faith and practice. Accordingly, before trying to come up with a consistently Reformed view on interfaith marriage, it might be helpful to develop those three confessionally based principles by which our theology of marriage can be better informed.
Marriage and the visible church:
The WCF is clear that (1) there is no ordinary possibility of salvation outside the visible church. In other words, it is normative but not absolutely necessary that God leads believers into identification with congregations of the universal church that profess the true religion. (WCF 25:2) The Reformed church also teaches (2) that (a) the Pope of Rome is a usurper, (b) Roman Catholicism, with the pope as her head, is an apostate church and as such (c) the Roman Catholic communion, according to her theology, is a synagogue of Satan. (WCF 25:5,6) From those two governing principles we may surmise that it is at least possible that a true believer can be a member of the Roman Catholic communion even though Rome is not a true church.
Private judgment must give way to objective ecclesiastical standing:
Although some Roman Catholics profess faith in Christ in accordance with the true religion of the Protestant Reformation, by identifying with the Roman communion through membership and attendance such professing believers objectively remain outside the visible church of Christ, and no private judgment can remedy that reality. The question is how that objective reality relates to Christians marrying Roman Catholics.
Although professing Roman Catholics can live in contradiction to their communion by professing the true gospel of salvation, by the standard of the Presbyterian Church of America (PCA) they are not “communicants in good standing in any evangelical church” and, therefore, are barred from the Lord’s Supper until their profession coincides with their church affiliation. Or as the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC) would have it, a member of the Roman communion is not a “professing communicant member in good standing in a church that professes the gospel of God’s free grace in Jesus Christ” and, therefore, is not warmly invited to partake of the body and blood of our Lord.
At the very least, from a Reformed ecclesiastical perspective, fellowship with Rome necessarily keeps one from identifying with the Christian church and receiving the nourishment of Christ with other believers at the Lord’s Supper.
It’s not enough that one merely professes faith in Christ if he also lives in the unrepentant sin of spiritual adultery, which leads us to our third and final principle pertaining to the undue dichotomization of faith and practice.
(As we read on it might be useful to consider whether ecclesiastical precepts drawn from Scripture should override private judgement on one’s salvation, or can private judgements be reconciled with the implications of sound elder-rule ecclesiology.)
Faith and practice:
It’s hardly controversial that a good and faithful Roman Catholic is one who not only trusts in the damning gospel of Rome but also considers the Protestant gospel anathema. (See: The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, Sixth session, January 13, 1547: Chapters 7,8,10, and 16, Canons 12,24,30, and 32) Not surprisingly, a good Roman Catholic’s profession of faith is never credible by confessional Protestant standards. But what about the profession of a bad Roman Catholic – one who professes “Christ alone” while remaining in communion with the pope? How should Protestants regard such as these?
Here again we must respect that it is the elders of the church and not individual maverick-Christians that “bind and loose” in the name of Christ. It is the elders on behalf of Christ that open the kingdom to penitent sinners, declare absolution and admit sinners to the Lord’s Supper. (WCF 30.2)
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Could the Fallible Universal Church Have Failed to Receive the Canon?

Jesus promised to build his church and told his apostles that those who received them were receiving Him. (Matt. 10:40; Matt. 16:18) The implication is that the building project of the Lord was to be founded upon the message of the apostles and prophets with Christ Jesus being the chief cornerstone. (Eph. 2:20) Consequently, the words of the apostles and Christ (whether penned by them or not) had to be preserved and received without error because Jesus promised to build his church upon them, which is now a matter of history given the passing of the apostles and the historical establishment of the New Testament church. 

Discussions over the canon have often pertained to surveying patristic evidence for the process and completion of canonization. These traditional pursuits have been aimed at answering important historical questions more than thorny epistemological ones. Yet in Reformed circles there seems to be a renewed interest in the theology of the canon and a deeper appreciation for the premise that answering when and how the canon process was completed is insufficient to establish whether the church most likely got it right. Accordingly, a fresh cumulative approach to canon studies is advancing in an effort to justify our belief that we have the canon. With this approach comes the acknowledgement that any criteria for identifying canonical books that is not grounded in Scripture betrays Scripture’s authority and proper place of canonical influence.
The more recent epistemologically self-conscious approach identifies specific complementary attributes that books of the Bible must contain as prescribed by Scripture itself. (It also wards off erroneous charges of circular reasoning by establishing certain unique features of epistemic commitment.)
The Basics
If the church has received the canon, then obviously she was exposed to the books that would comprise the canon. (The former presupposes the latter.) Furthermore, if the church has received the canon flawlessly, we would expect that she universally and over time responded favorably to marks of divinity that would have come by way of Scripture’s inspired and authoritative authors. Does this mean, however, that our confidence in the sixty-six books of the Bible (and none other) rests upon (a) the historic church’s fallible discernment of the divine qualities of scripture and (b) its historical evaluation of apostolicity that would have resulted in corporate reception?
Although I believe Scripture affords us even greater assurance – assurance that affords us access to the ultimate justification for our belief that we have the canon – the current trend robustly affirms and happily complies with the Reformed tenet that “our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts”. (WCF 1.5) In other words, the Confession is not addressing how we can know that the church received the canon but instead is teaching us how we know we are reading God’s word when we read the Bible.
A Distinction Is in Order
Apprehending the divine qualities of Scripture is to hear the voice of God therein. The Holy Spirit’s witness entails our being struck by the profundity of doctrine and experiencing the wisdom and blessedness of its teaching and practical application. Although we are sometimes unjustified in our discernments, knowledge can obtain when we are not. (Internalist-infallibilism leads to epistemological skepticism.) Notwithstanding, assurance through the consensus of the church and confidence in the historical assessment of authoritative origins of canonical books is not on par with hearing God’s voice in Scripture. That is to say, complementary attributes of canonicity aren’t necessarily equivalent attributes. For instance, all believers, to one degree or another, receive testimony of the Holy Spirit in accordance with the teaching of Scripture; yet perhaps most who hear the voice of God in Scripture do so without (ever) considering the corroborating evidence of corporate reception and prophetic origins. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how (a) fallible corporate consensus and (b) historical evidence for authoritative origins can persuade in the same way or on the same order of the direct testimony of the Holy Spirit that accompanies the infallible word of God (or even non-discursive properly basic beliefs that are immediately obtained through sensory experience).
At the very least, fallible corporate consensus about apostolicity culminating in the catholic reception of canonical books would be a byproduct of the church having already discerned the divine qualities of Scripture by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. (Another case of the former presupposing the latter.) In the former case the Holy Spirit’s internal witness would work in conjunction with his inspired Word that is spiritually discerned and applied by the church. Whereas in the latter case persuasion would be corroborative in nature, according to legitimate beliefs in reasons for believing the church has corporately heard the voice of her Shepherd. And although reasoned belief in authoritative origins would certainly pave the way to attentive consideration of a message from a perceived authoritative source, certain Jews were more “fair-minded” than those in Thessalonica because they did not rely upon apostolic credentials but on the analogy of faith (comparing Scripture with Scripture). Even the Thessalonians received the Word not because of its human source, but as the word of God through the full persuasive power of the Holy Spirit. (Acts 17:11; 1 Thessalonians 1:5)
Divine inspiration is both sufficient and necessary for ancient writings to be authoritative. Consequently, the church’s reception of the canonical books is not a condition for their intrinsic authority otherwise canonical books would not have been sacred Scripture until they were recognized and received as such. However, in a technical and qualified sense, after the universal church’s reception of the canon, the received canon does become sufficient for inspiration and ecclesiastical authority.
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