The book of Job is difficult to understand and tiring to get through. But some of its profoundest lessons are very simple. To the extent that we identify with Job, we learn that all God wants from us in a Job-like ordeal is to stick with him—just don’t give up on God. He’s not angry with us or trying to teach us a lesson. We only wait for his comforting presence (Job 42:5) and restoring mercies (Job 42:10). The ordeal will do its purifying work on its own. And to whatever extent we identify with the friends, we are instructed to repent of our tendency to pontificate, to solve someone’s problems for them, to blame them when their lives collapse.

One important question in reading any biblical text is who you, as a reader, identify with. This is easier for some texts than for others, of course. In Genesis, for example, it is not difficult to identify with the patriarchs as they struggle and endure in trusting God’s promises to bless them and redeem creation. But who do we identify with in the book of Job? Job’s spirituality and level of blessing are so impressive (Job 1:1–4) that probably few readers would think themselves equal to Job—and his suffering is so extreme, so nightmarish, that few would want to. On the other hand, the friends are so bombastic, tiresome, and quick to condemn Job that probably most of us think I hope I’m not like that!
Strange as it might sound, however, I think we are meant to identify both with Job and his friends. You can see this in several ways. With regard to Job, the first chapter of the book portrays Job-like suffering as something every saint will have to go through at some point. You can see this in the background of the conversation between the Almighty and the Accuser in Job 1:6–12,; Job 2:1–6. Comparing these passages to chapters like 1 Kings 22, Isaiah 6, and Revelation 4–5, it is easier to see that the Bible portrays the heavenly throne room as one where the Sovereign sits on his throne, receiving reports from his angelic servants, and making policy decisions as he rules creation (I think that’s in the background of the sons of God “presenting themselves” before God in Job 1:6). This means that the decision God makes about Job—allowing the Accuser to ruin his life, even though Job has done nothing to deserve it—reflects his policies for the whole world. The first chapter of Job is showing us that God’s normal policy with his saints is generosity both in spiritual blessings and earthly ones (Job 1:1–4)—but that God reserves the right to interrupt that policy in order to prove the reality and sincerity of our relationship with him.
Sobering as it is to consider, it must be so. After all, the issue of whether a Christian loves God for God’s sake, irrespective of what secondary blessings we gain or lose in our earthly lives (Job 1:9), is deeply relevant to every Christian. In a way, it is the issue of our lives. If we love God for some reason external to himself, we’ll be bored in heaven. I don’t think the book of Job is implying that our suffering will be as extreme as Job’s (having to bury all of our children, sick to the point of death, financially ruined, all in one day). But God will sometimes allow an ordeal which has a Job-like quality. Because God loves us and is fitting our souls for eternity, he will sometimes put us in the position of having every earthly reason to give up on him as a way of purifying our motives for being a Christian in the first place. In other words, probably every Christian will, at some point, find themselves echoing the question of Job’s wife in Job 2:9: Why hold on to integrity with God when all I get is pain? And through the empowering presence of the Holy Spirit, the only answer possible in that situation will come to us: God, and God alone.
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Prayer, as Calvin puts it, is our chief expression of faith. Prayer is how faith is manifested and expressed. If you don’t believe there is a God or that you need God, then you don’t pray. But if you do believe there is a God who hears, if you believe that you need Him, then the way you express that belief is through prayer.

So far in this series on pastoral character, we’ve considered the role of the pastor’s piety and the pastor’s holiness upon his ministry. Those articles have largely been cautionary, warning pastors against the particular temptations that come in ministry. But what should a pastor cultivate positively in order to grow in pastoral character? Spurgeon’s first answer would likely be the importance of cultivating communion with Christ, expressed in the pastor’s private prayer.
The Problem: Ministerialism
One of the greatest dangers that the minister faces is the danger of what Spurgeon calls formalism or officialism or ministerialism. Listen to his description:
The worst [snare a minister can face] is the temptation to ministerialism — the tendency to read our Bibles as ministers, to pray as ministers, to get into doing the whole of our religion as not ourselves personally, but only relatively concerned in it. To lose the personality of repentance and faith is a loss indeed…
I hate ministerialism, yet I often find it creeping upon me. One gets inside a pulpit, and begins to feel that he is not as other men are; but I like, if I can, to preach as a sinner to sinners; as one saved by grace to tell the love which Christ had towards me, the chief of sinners, and “less than the least of all saints.” I do not doubt that, as soon as you get out your little book to take with you, you feel like a missionary, and not simply like a sinner saved by grace. But, I pray you, do not feel like a missionary; feel like a sinner who has been washed in the precious blood of Jesus. You will never do good if you go to your work simply because of your office, [rather than] because of your soul being in it, because your heart yearns toward sinners, because you must have them saved. Strive not against any habits that are good; but against that evil tendency which, somehow or other, Satan, who is exceedingly crafty, manages to cast over our very best habits.
In other words, even as we pursue holiness and fight sin, we have to keep the gospel central. We have to cultivate a deep awareness and sorrow over our personal sin and the temptations of our hearts. We have to live in dependence on God’s grace in Christ. And then we speak as sinners saved by grace. This is how our holiness becomes warm and attractive.
Apart from our own personal grasp of the gospel, all our efforts at piety and holiness will become a stumbling block to our own sanctification and ministry. The strange thing is that people don’t always notice ministerialism in their pastor. The unspiritual people in the congregation won’t mind that their pastor doesn’t demonstrate any spiritual life before them. Even while the minister is just keeping up appearances, a church can have a growing budget and the congregation can be entertained. But in the end, as far as the pastor is concerned, it’s all external rituals and no spiritual life.
Spurgeon describes one such situation:
I read the other day, that no phase of evil presented so marvelous a power for destruction, as the unconverted minister of a parish, with a £1200 organ, a choir of ungodly singers, and an aristocratic congregation. It was the opinion of the writer, that there could be no greater instrument for damnation out of hell than that. People go to their place of worship and sit down comfortably, and think they must be Christians, when all the time all that their religion consists in, is listening to an orator, having their ears tickled with music, and perhaps their eyes amused with graceful action and fashionable manners; the whole being no better than what they hear and see at the opera — not so good, perhaps, in point of aesthetic beauty, and not an atom more spiritual. Thousands are congratulating themselves, and even blessing God that they are devout worshippers, when at the same time they are living in an unregenerate Christless state, having the form of godliness, but denying the power thereof. He who presides over a system which aims at nothing higher than formalism, is far more a servant of the devil than a minister of God.
May such words never be said of our ministries.
The Answer: Private Prayer
So what’s the solution? How do we fight against formalism? We fight by cultivating our private prayer lives, our communion with God. And Spurgeon particularly emphasizes prayer… Not just Bible reading, but prayer, i.e. communion with Christ.
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In his arguments TE Johnson rests on appeals to his own authority, first as a same-sex attracted man, then as an academic, then as a theologian, and then as a minister. He communicates authoritatively and effectively, and he has clearly convinced many that his understanding of how God interacts with same-sex attracted people is the right one: God’s ability to change people affected by this particular sin is only a remote possibility and should not be held out as a realistic hope for Christians; it would be extremely rare that they might change.  There cannot be a more succinct denial of God’s power to sanctify.

Dissenting OpinionSJC 2020-12 Complaint of TE Ryan Speck v Missouri PresbyteryRE Steve Dowling, joined by TE Paul Bankson, RE John Bise, RE Mel Duncan,RE Sam Duncan, TE Fred Greco, and RE John WhiteOctober 31st, 2021
                We respectfully dissent from the court’s ruling in this case on the following grounds:

That Presbytery did not exercise the “due diligence” required by BCO 31-2 in its investigation and that it therefore committed “clear error” [BCO 39-3] in making its determinations;
That the SJC was not bound by the “great deference” requirement of BCO 39-3 because this is a case centering on Constitutional interpretation; and
That the substantive conclusions reached by Presbytery and confirmed by the SJC do not follow from the facts in the Record of the case.

The first two grounds are procedural, while the third is on the merits of the case.  Each of these grounds is important, and each error has significant consequences for the denomination.
That Presbytery did not exercise the due diligence required by BCO 31-2 in its investigation and that it therefore committed clear error [BCO 39-3] in its determinations
While this case is nuanced, it isn’t particularly complex and some parts of it are simple.  One of the easiest things to understand about it is that the SJC went through most of the judicial process, including its final hearing with the parties to the case, and then opened the record to get more information. Here is the court’s reasoning for doing that:
The SJC believes it is necessary to attempt to clarify the Record of the Case because its magnitude (over 600 pages covering multiple years of writing, speaking, and judicial processes) makes it difficult to ascertain if specific representations of perspectives of TE Johnson are his actual or present theological convictions.
The first thing to notice here is that the SJC says it sought further clarification because the ROC was hard to understand.  If the SJC -a group that is reasonably expert in these kinds of processes and issues- cannot make enough sense of the record to reach a conclusion, it’s difficult to see how Presbytery understood it well enough to reach its conclusions.  Further, the SJC had before it not only everything Presbytery had before it as a court, but also additional briefs, the benefit of a full additional hearing, and oral examination of the parties.  Though we have no doubt about the fair motives of the court, it proved through its actions that due diligence hadn’t been exercised by Presbytery. If it had been, there could be no need to get clarification after a record had once been declared judicially in order, a hearing held, and SJC deliberations begun.
It bears noting that the extent of this clarification was substantial.  It wasn’t just that there was a question or two about some specific point in the record, but instead the apparent need for the SJC to form a committee create interrogatives, communicate them to the accused, and receive his responses.  This process resulted in 103 questions being submitted by members of the SJC.  From that catalog of questions, the committee chose 25 that it deemed the most useful (through a blind grading process).  TE Johnson answered the questions, and these answers -over and against the contents of the original ROC- provide much of the substance cited by the SJC in its support of Presbytery. For example, Allegation #1 is denied with 7 citations, 6 of which are from SJC questions.  The denial of Allegation #2 is supported by 4 citations from the original ROC, and 4 from the SJC’s additional questions.  For Allegation #3, the original ROC is cited once and the SJC’s questions are cited 7 times, and the numbers for Allegation #4 are 4 from the original record and 4 from the SJC.
The SJC’s supplemental work produced 67% of the citations used by it in support of Presbytery’s conclusions, strongly suggesting that Presbytery’s investigation was inadequate.  If the investigation was inadequate, then Presbytery’s conclusions constitute “clear error.”
The second thing to observe in the decision’s justification is that the SJC wasn’t sure whether
“… specific representations of perspectives of TE Johnson are his actual or present theological convictions.”
BCO Preliminary Principle 8 says this:
“Since ecclesiastical discipline must be purely moral or spiritual in its object, and not attended with any civil effects, it can derive no force whatever, but from its own justice, the approbation of an impartial public, and the countenance and blessing of the great Head of the Church.”
It’s hard to conceive that an ‘impartial public’ would approve of seeking the “present theological convictions” of an accused nearly two years after the discrete incident resulting in a complaint occurred, particularly in the absence of any effort to acquire contrary evidence. This extension of time to the present and ex post facto acquisition of information on the part of the court appears to be a misuse of judicial discretion, with the court having undertaken more of a pseudo-BCO 31-2 investigation than an action to perfect the record.  Since the opportunity to answer questions two years after the fact was extended to TE Johnson, then the door should have opened to evidence (if there is any) related to his actions, social media utterances, and writings over the past two years which might contradict the veracity of his carefully formulated responses. Collecting evidence in that manner would be consistent with the desire for a complete record rather than merely an expanded record.
Discussions of fairness aside, TE Johnson’s present positions are irrelevant to the complaint against him.  The actions of the court and TE Speck’s subsequent complaint exist within a discrete timeframe that ended with the initiation of the complaint.  It’s a closed set of circumstances, and subsequent events and information cannot properly be introduced.
In summary, the SJC’s actions bear testimony to the fact that Presbytery’s investigation was inadequate, and since it was inadequate the subsequent determinations made on that inadequate investigation were “clear error.”  Moreover, the SJC distorted the record -however unintentionally- by soliciting the “present” views of TE Johnson.
That the SJC was not bound by the “great deference” requirement because this is a case centering on Constitutional interpretation
There are limitations on courts of review in the PCA.  BCO 39-3 enumerates these, saying first that a higher court should limit itself in its decisions to issues raised by the lower courts, and that higher courts shouldn’t overturn the decisions of lower courts unless there is “clear error.”  In applying these limitations there are conditions and exceptions.  For example, BCO 39-3.2 presupposes that the lower court’s proximity to the events in question better qualifies it to judge a case, and BCO 39-3.3 presupposes better ability to judge based on “familiar acquaintance” with events and parties.  Putting aside the obvious argument that familiarity may actually compromise a court’s objectivity in some cases, BCO 39-3.4 establishes that:
“The higher court does have the power and obligation of judicial review, which cannot be satisfied by always deferring to the findings of a lower court. Therefore, a higher court should not consider itself obliged to exhibit the same deference to a lower court when the issues being reviewed involve the interpretation of the Constitution of the Church. Regarding such issues, the higher court has the duty and authority to interpret and apply the Constitution of the Church according to its best abilities and understanding, regardless of the opinion of the lower court.”
The matter at hand is a doctrinal case requiring interpretation of the Constitution of the Church and the SJC was not obliged to grant “great deference” to the lower court. Moreover, the SJC had the duty to address the issues raised in the complaint without dependence on the “great deference” standard, but it conducted the case instead as if it were bound by the provisions of BCO 39-3.2 and 3.  While we respect the SJC’s unwillingness to exceed its mandate, or to position itself as the arbiter of truth for the Assembly, this is an abdication of responsibility with respect to BCO 39-3.4.
Further, by not meeting its obligation to interpret the constitution of the church under BCO 39-3.4, the SJC has affirmed Presbytery’s authority to make Constitutional and theological declarations on behalf of the denomination.  Since the decision made by Presbytery in declining to indict has been affirmed, the SJC not only has reinforced the idea that this authority lies with individual Presbyteries, it has also formalized a dubious Constitutional interpretation of SSA and how it applies to ordination.
That the substantive conclusions reached by Presbytery and confirmed by the SJC do not follow from the facts in the Record of the case
Again, while nuanced, this case only becomes complex when the things pertaining to sexual dysphoria among Christians generally are made indistinct from ordination requirements, and when the semantic ranges of terms used in the discussion are narrowed, expanded, or otherwise changed according to undiscernable criteria.  In the first case, solid biblical arguments for the church to embrace “sexual minorities” are extended to ordained service as if there could be no category of sin, or no operative level of a specific type of sin, that is a priori disqualifying.  In the second, the symbols (or words) with which we communicate are redefined without agreement, having been appropriated by those with special knowledge of the distinctions they desire from the symbols.
For example, the word “homosexual” appears just under 2400 times in the record for this case.  In virtually all the places where it’s used the term is semantically equivalent to “same sex attracted,” so there seems to be a high correlation between the symbol and the thing signified in common usage, with some translators using the word to translate arsenokoitai 1 Corinthians 6:7-9.  Even so, here is what TE Johnson says:
“Neither malakoi or arsenokoitai map very tightly onto this modern use of gay or homosexual or same-sex attracted as an orientation.”
He is saying that the biblical strictures are not closely aligned with the “modern” use of the words as an “orientation,” but there is no biblical support for arguing that the concepts in 1 Corinthians 6 are culturally bound. Pucci provides some insight here:
“…the Muses sing a discourse similar to true things, but with some distortion, invention, or deflection -in a word, with some differences.  The similarity vouches for the credibility of the discourse, while the invention, deflection, and difference make it false.”
We mean by this that fine distinctions and novel interpretations may obfuscate truth rather than illuminate it, and that the effort to more narrowly define meaning can have the effect of removing meaning altogether, turning truth into falsehood and vice-versa.  In this case, TE Johnson’s reinterpretation of the meanings of malakoi and arsenokoitai through a modern lens to make a distinction related to “orientation” does little to clarify the issue from a biblical standpoint.
The ROC is clear that TE Johnson identifies himself as a “same-sex attracted man.” Irrespective of whether there’s a distinction between that and “homosexual,” and whether or not malakoi and arsenokoitai “map tightly” to the scriptures condemning homosexuality, TE Johnson provides enough evidence from his own statements to make it obvious that this characteristic is so core to his being and so central to his personal narrative that it disqualifies him from ordained service.
TE Johnson’s testimony establishes that he has seen himself as same-sex attracted since he was 11 years old.  He says he has never had an attraction to a woman and that he finds the idea of looking at a woman lustfully “disgusting.”  He says that his public ministry as a same-sex attracted man is intended to help others who are suffering and ashamed about their own same-sex attraction, and in his 2019 General Assembly speech, he claimed that Article 7 of the Nashville Statement “hurt” because it asserts that it is a sin to adopt a homosexual self-conception.
TE Johnson’s self-identification per se, then, is not a disputable issue; the real question is whether this identification “compromises and dishonors” his identity in Christ, and there is good reason to conclude that it does, because TE Johnson consistently palliates the sin of same-sex attraction such that he dishonors God.  For example, he first appeals to the universality of sin to make the argument that same-sex attraction is just like any other sin, while the Constitution’s exposition of Scripture asserts that some sins are more heinous than others (with homosexuality “more heinous” than even inappropriate heterosexual activity by virtue of it being against nature).
While it is true that all people are sinners, it is not true that all sins alike are equal. If they were, then every argument advanced by TE Johnson with respect to same-sex attraction would have to apply equally to every kind of sin.  The sin of pedophilia would have to be considered no worse than anger; the sin of bestiality no worse than drunkenness.  While it is true that all people are sinners and all deserve God’s wrath, and while it is true that no one’s righteousness is good enough to contribute to his salvation, arguments for sin equivalencies mock the word of God and dishonor Him.
Second, TE Johnson is a late middle-aged man of high achievement.  He is well-educated and has an earned PhD establishing him as an expert historian.  He is an author.  He is a lifelong minster who carries the imprimatur of a Seminary education and ordination by one of the most biblically sound denominations in the world.  All these things constitute aggravations of his sinful same-sex attraction and his teaching related to it according to the Constitution of the church.  Question 151 of the Larger Catechism asks what constitute aggravating factors for sins more heinous, and they are these: “…if they (the persons offending) be of riper age, greater experience or grace, eminent for profession, gifts, place, office, guides to others, and those whose example is likely to be followed by others.”
TE Johnson not only dishonors God in his prominent self-identification as a same-sex attracted man, the matter is made worse by his age, leadership position, and level of achievement.
The ROC demonstrates that TE Johnson is capable of formulating an orthodox view of sanctification, but it also demonstrates that he minimizes the possibility of change for people suffering from sexual dysphoria.  He acknowledges that God can do anything in much the same way Cessationists acknowledge that God could still perform a miracle in the world; that is, He could, but He won’t. He contends strongly -on the basis of his research and experience- that orientation change practically never happens, citing statistics that establish that only 3.5% to 4% of people will ever experience any change from same-sex attraction to natural attraction.
In his arguments TE Johnson rests on appeals to his own authority, first as a same-sex attracted man, then as an academic, then as a theologian, and then as a minister. He communicates authoritatively and effectively, and he has clearly convinced many that his understanding of how God interacts with same-sex attracted people is the right one: God’s ability to change people affected by this particular sin is only a remote possibility and should not be held out as a realistic hope for Christians; it would be extremely rare that they might change.  There cannot be a more succinct denial of God’s power to sanctify.
At the same time, the form of this argument is the opposite of TE Johnson’s argument about the equivalency of sin.  First, he claims that all sin is alike and SSA is no different from any other sin in order to establish that it cannot be a disqualifying factor for ordination.  He subsequently says that while all sin is alike, and all people are sinners, sins related to sexual dysphoria are utterly different in that God hardly ever acts to change people from them and therefore those sins need to be accepted as an ontological phenomenon -they are part of being. By that line of reasoning any other sexual sin must also be accepted as a condition of being, whatever the perversion.
While the ROC doesn’t show that TE Johnson entirely denies that sanctification could extend to a sexual orientation change, it clearly shows that he doesn’t expect it to, even arguing that people need to understand the truth and not be optimistic about change when they are saved [ROC 461, ROC 928, etc.]. In the same way, TE Johnson both claims the power of sanctification in his life and denies it, particularly when he speaks about his sexual appetites, which continue unabated:
“I share about once a year from the pulpit that I’m a porn addict. I haven’t actually looked at pornography for 15 years, but when I did, I was all in and that pull is still as strong as it was. I’ve mortified this for 15 years and it still, you know, I see a computer terminal unmonitored and immediately my mind thinks, I want to look at porn. Fifteen years of strangling this thing, and it doesn’t die, it doesn’t go away [ROC 453}… “
And:
“TE Johnson: “You wanna know about my sexual brokenness? I am happy to talk to you about what I talked about in the pulpit two weeks ago, and that I think is relevant to this conversation. I am a pornography addict. I have had a pornography addiction for 15 years. Actually 18” Interviewer 2: “Are you still doing pornography, Greg?” TE Johnson: “No, I haven’t for 15 years.” Interviewer 1: 1 “So you’re not an addict.” Interviewer 2: “So you’re not an addict anymore.” TE Johnson: “Oh, but I know what it does inside of me. You see, I know that if I look at one image, I’m going to look at a thousand. I know I’m not going to come up for air for hours.” [ROC 553-554, 568”]
Some might be tempted to minimize these statements because of the circumstances of a live interview.  TE Johnson says as much, having called this interaction a “train wreck.” That is an assessment of the outcome but not necessarily the conversation, since the interviewers were clearly trying to dissuade TE Johnson from the point he was trying to make, and TE Johnson himself argued harder and harder for his vulnerability to these sins in order to impress upon them how powerful its control is over him.  The Constitutional aggravations listed above apply here.  If TE Johnson were young or naïve or inexperienced in public interactions, these might serve to mitigate his responsibility for what he said; it might provide an argument from extenuation.  Instead, he is mature, educated, esteemed, and an accomplished public speaker. He clearly believes what he insistently told these interviewers and his words cannot be ignored.
By these beliefs and descriptions of his own experience, TE Johnson minimizes God’s purposes and power in sanctification, while at the same time demonstrating the grip by which his sin holds him.  In his testimony [ROC 610], his sermons [ROC 606], his public speeches [ROC 556] and his writings [ROC 812-830] TE Johnson has made his homosexuality central to his self-perception, his self-presentation, and to his ministry. He has become a public figure as a result, and it is clear from the record that he is regarded as an authority on the subject -one who expressly teaches and intends to teach his version of “truth” as it relates to SSA.
While the ROC and his public utterances demonstrate great facility with language and theological nuance and sometimes serve to obfuscate clear issues, TE Johnson’s fundamental argument for serving as an ordained minister of the gospel is that he is now -and has always been- chaste, making him immune to disciplinary action for sexual misconduct.
By this standard no sexual predilection is disqualifying as long as it doesn’t materialize in an act.  Therefore, the pedophile who suffers in the way TE Johnson does -that is, one who had no hope of change or no resistance to a single look at child pornography such that he “…wouldn’t come up for air for hours…” is eligible for ordination. The same would also clearly be true of someone who struggled with illicit heterosexual attractions under the same conditions, but it is unimaginable that a man would be called as a minister of the gospel who said, “I struggle with lust for women to the point that I don’t expect change, and I’m also an addict who is one look away from complete immersion in pornography -but don’t worry, I only think about it.  I’m not currently doing it.”.
Despite the many excellent points made by TE Johnson about the difficulties faced by Christians who experience SSA or sexual dysphoria, and despite much good advice on how to minister to “sexual minorities,” these arguments cannot be applied without distinction to ordained service.
In summary, the SJC overlooked the clear deficiencies of Presbytery’s investigation, which is proven by re-opening the record and admitting additional information that sought the “present” positions of TE Johnson, extending consideration of facts well beyond the events complained against.  Moreover, it was incumbent on the SJC to deal with the matters raised by the Complainant as issues of Constitutional interpretation instead of deferring to the lower court in this case.  For these reasons, we respectfully dissent from the majority decision.
This opinion was written by RE Steve Dowling