The Shunammite woman demonstrates the life found in Christ’s Word in her obedience to the Word of God. She listened to God’s warning – famine was coming. She heard God’s instruction – get away from here! She obeyed God by leaving Israel and going to the land of the Philistines. Seven years she was away from her home and country. During this time another occupied the home she had so carefully kept. But by listening to and obeying the Word of God she received the benefit, she and her family lived!

So the woman arose and did according to the saying of the man of God, and she went with her household and dwelt in the land of the Philistines seven years. It came to pass, at the end of seven years, that the woman returned from the land of the Philistines; and she went to make an appeal to the king for her house and for her land.
II Kings 8:2-3 NKJV
What makes the Bible unique? Walking through the airport recently I saw the best selling book, “How to Win Friends & Influence People.” Another nearby was, “How to Do the Work.” There are books teaching readers “How Not to Hate Your Husband After Kids,” “How to Retire Happy, Wild, and Free,” and how to “Live Your Best Life Now.” So many books telling us how to do things that should make our lives more fulfilling. What we don’t find in these books, however, is what we need most, eternal life.
The Bible is altogether unique and superior to the plethora of other books for two reasons: 1) its author; and 2) its message. No other book in the universe has the same author as the Bible. The Bible is the Word of God (1). God is the author of the Bible.
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Natural law thinking profoundly shaped the way American and British leaders approached issues involving rights, sovereignty, and constitutional government. However, the imperial authorities and their colonial opponents often appealed to different, and even conflicting, strains of the natural law tradition.

This essay explores the role of natural law philosophy in the imperial crisis between Britain and the American colonies in the twelve years leading up to the Declaration of Independence in 1776.  Both the British governments and the colonial champions during the crisis were the inheritors of a complex tradition of natural law philosophy dating back centuries.  At its core, this tradition revolved around the proposition that there is a standard of natural justice that exists independently of human contrivance, and that acts as a measure for the legitimacy of civil laws and political institutions.  Natural law thinking profoundly shaped the way American and British leaders approached issues involving rights, sovereignty, and constitutional government.  However, the imperial authorities and their colonial opponents often appealed to different, and even conflicting, strains of the natural law tradition. The tension between the various understandings of natural jurisprudence involved in the imperial dispute would have serious implications for the evolving, and ultimately incompatible, British and American conceptions of the Empire.
In order to understand the intellectual context surrounding the imperial crisis, it is important to appreciate the pervasive influence of natural law philosophy in early-modern Europe and America.  Educated Britons and Americans were the products of a rich intellectual heritage spanning from medieval to modern times.  St. Thomas Aquinas founded the Christian natural law tradition in the 13th century by articulating a conception of natural justice rooted in reason and God’s rule over the created world.  By the 17th century, natural law philosophy had developed into a multifarious body of thought with distinct conservative and radical strains.[1]  The conservative natural law school exemplified by such thinkers as Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Samuel Pufendorf drew decidedly authoritarian political implications from the natural law principles of natural liberty and equality.  They tended to emphasize a strong, and even absolute, version of political sovereignty and generally rejected popular self-government and the right of revolution.  For their part, radical natural law theorists such as John Locke, Benedict Spinoza, and Algernon Sidney built an argument for popular sovereignty on the bedrock principles of individual rights, especially the right to property and the right of conscience, as well as a natural right of revolution.  It was to this complex natural law inheritance that both Britons and Americans appealed in their quarrel during the imperial crisis.  However, their different interpretations of this philosophic tradition are what account in large measure for their divergent arguments and attitudes throughout the crisis.
Eighteenth-century Britain witnessed the emergence of conservative natural law principles adapted to the unique conditions of parliamentary rule.  In the decades following the Glorious Revolution, the British political nation adopted a conservative interpretation of the events of 1688–89, which emphasized continuity, the legal fiction of King James’s “abdication,” and most importantly asserted the institutional sovereignty of the tripartite Parliament including king, lords, and commons.  The radical principles of popular sovereignty and individual natural rights were for the most part rejected.  By the middle of the eighteenth century, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was the dominant political and constitutional ideology in Britain.  This hardening of the orthodoxy of parliamentary sovereignty can be seen in the influential writings of Sir William Blackstone published at the start of the imperial crisis.  With clear echoes of the conservative natural law conception of sovereignty championed by Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf, Blackstone insisted that in every constitution there had to be a “supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which . . . the rights of sovereignty reside.”[2]  The implications of this commitment were obvious.  British efforts to tighten control over the colonies through taxation rested on the philosophical premise that Parliament is the highest law-making body in the empire and is thus in the legal sense absolute and irresistible inasmuch as colonial legislatures are subordinate vis-à-vis Westminster.  The depth of the British commitment to this conservative conception of sovereignty was crystallized in the Declaratory Act of 1766, which followed the repeal of the Stamp Act.  While the Ministry repealed the stamp tax on prudential grounds, the Parliament asserted its right in principle to legislate for the colonies “in all cases whatsoever.”[3]  As parliamentary sovereignty was the governing philosophy of Britain, so too by extension must it logically be the organizing principle of the British Empire.
The colonial position in the imperial crisis was also informed by natural law philosophy; however, supporters of the American cause interpreted this tradition rather differently from the British.  Most importantly, the radical natural law theory of Sidney and Locke, long déclassé in Britain, flourished in the colonies alongside typically conservative philosophical commitments.  With the radicals, Americans insisted that some element of popular control over government was vital to secure liberty—a condition impossible in a distant parliament in which the colonies were not represented.  Thus, Americans defended the principle that only the colonial legislatures could legitimately tax the colonists.  However, in the early stages of the crisis most supporters of the colonial cause also expressed deep admiration for the British balanced constitution produced in the Glorious Revolution and its replicas in the colonial governments (in which the Crown appointed governors who shared rule with the elected assemblies). Moreover, many early colonial champions conceded the British point that Parliament is sovereign in the empire, although they disputed the rightness of its taxing the colonies directly as opposed to merely regulating imperial trade policy.  While accepting the theoretical principle of parliamentary sovereignty, Americans had not actually experienced their political life as being subject to Parliament in the century of benign neglect prior to 1764.  In practice, they felt that assertions of parliamentary sovereignty were a dangerous innovation in imperial relations.
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The most salient reason for the Dissent was that basically the SJC created a new Record of the Case (ROC).  Generally, the ROC consists only of the documents generated by the both parties in a case during the time of the original investigation and proceedings.  In this case, an additional investigation was commenced by the SJC long after the original case was documented.  This appeared to be for the purpose of identifying any changes in Mr. Johnson’s present views as compared to his previous views. This may be a laudable goal, but it is irrelevant to this case.

The Dissenting Opinion on the Case that was before the PCA Standing Judicial Commission (SJC) regarding the Missouri Presbytery and Greg Johnson has been published (The Aquila Report, 12/13/21).  I want to publicly thank this group of men for making known the reasons for their Dissent.  Actually, even though many of us consider the decision of the SJC to be a loss, yet this public statement representing the minority vote is an encouragement for countless numbers in the PCA.  I personally appreciate the position these men took in opposition to the majority of the Commission.  A few remarks may be in order.
First, I hold a minority position in the PCA.  I believe that anyone who identifies himself publicly as a homosexual is automatically disqualified from holding office in the PCA.  I therefore have my qualms about part of the process in the Case.
The Dissent asserts that there is good reason to believe that Mr. Johnson’s self-identity as a homosexual “compromises and dishonors” his identity in Christ.  This demonstrates my problem with the proposed changes to the Book of Church Order.  Rather than having a clear line of demarcation regarding the ordination of homosexuals, it creates a purity of thought test where no one can score 100, but no one can define what a passing score is. The Dissent argues that Mr. Johnson’s score is not high enough to pass.  The majority of the SJC concluded that he did pass.  This is highly subjective.  It will be highly subjective if the BOCO changes are adopted.
Secondly, the most salient reason for the Dissent was that basically the SJC created a new Record of the Case (ROC).  Generally, the ROC consists only of the documents generated by the both parties in a case during the time of the original investigation and proceedings.  In this case, an additional investigation was commenced by the SJC long after the original case was documented.  This appeared to be for the purpose of identifying any changes in Mr. Johnson’s present views as compared to his previous views. This may be a laudable goal, but it is irrelevant to this case.  If there have been changes in his views, then there are other ways to handle it.  According to the Dissent, “The SJC supplemental work produced 67% of the citations used by it in support of Presbytery’s conclusions…”  The SJC in essence created a new ROC, and thus, in a real sense, became the court of original jurisdiction.
By creating a new ROC, the SJC allowed Mr. Johnson to nuance his previous statements which happen to reflect the PCA Study Committee on Human Sexuality.  This was unfair to the Complainant.  He was not challenging the discovery statements that resulted from the later investigation of the SJC; he was challenging the original decision of Missouri Presbytery based on the statements made by Mr. Johnson nearly two years ago. (The Complainant’s framing of the original Statement of the Issue: “Did Missouri Presbytery err when it failed to find a strong presumption of guilt and institute process against TE Johnson regarding his stated views on human sexuality that appear to be significantly out of accord with and not in conformity with the Scriptures and the Westminster Standards?”)
Thirdly, the final vote on the SJC shows how important it is to know in more detail about the nominees for the Standing Judicial Commission at each General Assembly.  A difference in one single vote would have changed the outcome of this decision.
The PCA has a Standing Theological Examinations Committee which approves the orthodoxy of the nominees for positions at the General Assembly level, and declares them eligible to hold office.  The election of men to hold this important office has become rather perfunctory.  No doubt, the National Partnership (NP) has had a major influence on who gets elected.
Maybe it’s time to make public for the GA Commissioners a more thorough examination of these men, as is done with candidates for the United States Supreme Court. In some way we need to know the particular theological camp they represent in the PCA.  Judgment of the law is not always neutral.  Commissioners at the General Assembly need to be better informed about nominees.
Lastly, if the proposed BCO changes do not pass, then this will make two proximate losses for the conservative confessionalists in the PCA.  We might expect that some leaders in the PCA will begin to contemplate an exit plan in order to create a new denomination.
Some will plead for a continual fight, pointing out the victories at the previous General Assembly, and believing that they have the grassroots numbers to eventually gain back control of the PCA.  Others will not be so optimistic.  It is sad that it has all come down to this.
Larry E. Ball is a retired minister in the Presbyterian Church in America and is now a CPA. He lives in Kingsport, Tenn.